What inspired you to write this book and why do you think this 0peration has previously been neglected by English scholarship?

After I wrote the definitive work on Operation I-Go (Avonmore Books 2022), I became intrigued as to why it had received only cursory attention in Western histories. Despite special intelligence briefings around the time, the Allies remained unaware that the Japanese were up to anything unusual. A paradox is that Operation I-Go’s foremost accomplishment is that it authored Admiral Yamamoto's own demise when he and his core staff were killed on 18 April 1943 by the infamous USAAF aerial ambush over southern Bougainville when he was headed to Ballale Island.

If Operation I-Go was barely noticed by the Allies, then Ro-Go was even more mercurial in Allied eyes, thus explaining why it has been mostly ignored in Western histories. Yet the substantial size of the Operation and its execution is another of history’s paradoxes. There was prevarication leading up to its launch, and for good reason. Just as Operation Ro-Go was about to be implemented, an Allied landing on Mono and Stirling Islands just SW of Bougainville by New Zealand forces on 27 October 1943, saw both islands occupied and secured. After it was authorized, and before aircrews left Truk, they were told that their primary duty would be to attack enemy shipping, check enemy counter-offensives and destroy enemy surface units.

Both belligerents were adversely affected by weather throughout. The characteristic wet season was worse than most, and contested areas and the flightpaths to them were equally challenged by frontal systems with attendant capricious weather throughout. Thus the timing and execution of strikes was often dictated more by weather considerations than strategic or operational ones. Operation Ro-Go’s objectives abruptly switched to striking the Torokina landing area and the Task Force of ships which supported it. It is impossible to separate Operation Ro-Go with a series of naval battles which ensued over forthcoming weeks, as the outcomes of these confrontations much predicated its air movements.

By themselves, the numbers of losses the Japanese sustained during Operation Ro-Go were so severe that of the 173 carrier aircraft flown down from Truk on 1 November to initiate the Operation, only 53 returned there on 13 November, thus incurring a terrible loss rate of 70%.

 

What is your favourite piece of artwork included in the book?

No doubt Jim Laurier’s portrayal of a scene from 2 November 1943 - 345th Mitchells dropping parafrags over Rabaul township.  Jim worked carefully from numerous photos and maps to get both the geography and wartime layout of the town on the money. It’s a privilege to collaborate with such a fine aviation artist.

 

What is one of the myths that you debunk in this book?

The biggest myth is the claimed damage incurred by the Fifth Air Force strikes against Rabaul, the biggest one of which occurred on 2 November 1943. Every Western account will tell you this was a body blow to the Japanese, however the Japanese perspective is that it inconvenienced key components of Operation Ro-Go. The damage from the raid itself was quickly patched-up.

Furthermore, the aftermath of this raid was a bizarre US publicity campaign when, on 29 November 1943, the cover of Life magazine published a dramatic photograph of a Mitchell bomber flying low over Rabaul harbour. The associated caption stated that the October/ November 1943 series of USAAF Rabaul raids had destroyed 140 vessels and 700 aircraft. These overwhelming figures were sourced back to a US Army press briefing held in Brisbane three weeks prior which claimed that in the nine major Rabaul raids conducted between 10 October and 2nd November, 732 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed or damaged, along with 138 vessels destroyed. In fact only one destroyer had been sunk at Rabaul by the USAAF in this period, with at most 40 aircraft destroyed. In fact the most shipping damage was subsequently done by the USN 5 November raid against Rabaul Harbour. The myth of the effect of the Fifth AF raids continued to be perpetrated when, in 1949, former Fifth AF Commander General George Kenney wrote of the 2 November raid,

Never in the long history of warfare had so much destruction been wrought upon the forces of a belligerent nation so swiftly and at such little cost.

 

Tell us a little about the initial objectives of the Operation.

From the outset its objective was to slow American advances primarily in New Guinea but also the Solomons. Things went awry very quickly when its offensive ambitions coincidentally dovetailed with the commencement of the Allied northern Solomons campaign, in particular the Torokina landing. The Operation failed to achieve any of its key objectives. The Allies regarded the Operation as a series of expected and largely ineffectual attacks.

 

When did you first become fascinated with the Pacific Air War?

As a child in New Guinea in the 1960s many veterans from the conflict still lived in the town, reflected in the sombre moods at ANZAC Day ceremonies at Bomana Cemetery. The pall of history hung heavy over that town when I grew up. I was fascinated by aircraft which had fought there, and both sides of the air-war. I thirsted to know how the aerial war had been fought, who had fought it, and why. In 1965 we were given a school project about the evacuation of Dunkirk. As I read my part over the school loudspeaker, I wondered why no-one would tell me about the history of the war around Port Moresby. My curiosity became intense when I and a school friend carried the outer portion of a wing back to my house, complete with remnants of a British roundel. We took this from the wreckage of RAAF Kittyhawk A29-109 flown by Bill Cowe when he let down into the hillside in bad weather behind my school - Boroko East - on 28 August 1942. It would be more than three decades before I knew this. Why was I being taught about Dunkirk when there was the wreckage of an Australian fighter behind my school? It was because then people did not want to discuss New Guinea’s wartime history. It was not the business of children to know, and emotions were still raw – very raw. The Japanese, portrayed as inhumane and faceless, continued to be vilified. Many of my parents’ generation had suffered during the war, but I wanted to discover who the Japanese really were. In those days we knew nothing of the Japanese side of the war; reliable sources were unavailable for either side. And, the language divide was severe, and remains so, not to mention the wide chasm of cultural understanding. The more I burrowed into Japanese records and diaries the more curious I became and so here we are.

 

If you enjoyed today's blog post you can find out more in Operation Ro-Go 1943: Japanese air power tackles the Bougainville landings