1. Many sources cite Mukden as the largest pitched-land battle in history in its day – if that is the case, why is this battle not more widely known, or been more widely discussed and studied?

That is a great question. I believe the primary reason to be the proximity of the Russo-Japanese War to World War I. World War I was so monumental in both its scale and impact that it seems to overshadow much of the preceding 60 or so years of history in popular memory. While the battle of Mukden was massive by any standard prior to World War I, there were battles every year from 1914–18 that met or often exceeded Mukden in the total numbers involved and casualties.

Another reason lies in the way countries, nations and societies memorialize or remember wars and battles. The Imperial Russian government did institute a memorialization commission in the years following the Russo-Japanese War, but it was a limited effort and focused on episodes that provided a simpler story of sacrifice, such as the sinking of the battleship Aleksandr III with all hands at Tsushima. This battleship, for example, received a monument in St Petersburg in 1907. Mukden received no such monument prior to World War I, at which point the events of 1914–17 paused the commission’s efforts to memorialize the war. The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 meant that the army (and empire) that fought the battle of Mukden no longer existed.

Furthermore, the battle took place in what is modern-day China, which has shown no interest in memorializing the battle. The battle is not extensively remembered in Japan either, perhaps due to the subsequent Mukden incident in 1931 and the terrible war that followed.


2. Considering that the Russo-Japanese War and the Mukden campaign took place less than a decade before World War I, are there any lessons or aspects of this conflict that still recommend its study despite the plethora of campaigns and battles that followed a decade later?

There are aspects of Mukden that still make it stand out, despite the subsequent scale and importance of the battles of World War I. For one, the battle of Mukden was relatively short and decisive compared to some of the battles of World War I. The fighting at Mukden transpired over a period of three weeks, and, even by World War I standards, the casualties inflicted at Mukden were heavy given this relatively short timeline (over 150,000).

Perhaps most notably, large-scale maneuvers were continuously conducted in the battle of Mukden. While the armies at Mukden were large, the theatre of operations was massive. The vast expanse of Manchuria ensured that no matter how long the defensive lines of the Russians or Japanese might be, there remained a flank that could be turned or enveloped. Both sides deployed cavalry formations to screen these flanks and, ideally, to disrupt the advance of an enemy envelopment operation.

Another interesting element of this campaign was the role of foreign observers, notably from Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria and the United States, who studied with great interest the campaigns of the Russo-Japanese War. While machine guns, modern field artillery, defensive wire entanglements and other trappings of 20th-century war had been used in various conflicts in the previous decades, the world had yet to see these weapons fielded in a conflict between two armies that were trained, organized and equipped in accordance with contemporary western doctrine. Foreign observer officers were eager to find answers to theoretical questions, such as whether infantry assaults were still possible in the face of modern defensive firepower.


3. How did individual personalities, generals and soldiers affect the outcome of the battle/campaign? Or did this new ‘industrial age’ of warfare minimize the impact of individuals?

In modern military doctrine, it is common for staff officers to develop a list of crucial decisions a commander will likely make in a coming operation. These are based off key events that are likely to occur and will require the commander to make a concrete decision that may affect the outcome of the operation. Some examples of these decisions are when to commit the army’s reserves or when to switch from a defensive operation to a counter-attack.

In the Mukden campaign these types of decisions seem to have been very salient features that impacted the outcome of the battle. The Russian commander, General Kuropatkin, was convinced early in the battle that the Japanese main effort was being made against his left flank rather than his right. He ordered the transfer of reserves and other units to this flank, which due to the distances involved and under-developed nature of transportation networks in Manchuria, proved a slow process and painful error. This was a concrete decision that an individual commander made that impacted the course of the battle.

At slightly lower echelons of command, at the corps or division level, individual willful and competent commanders made important or even pivotal contributions in their sectors. The notable performance of Russian cavalry when commanded by General Pavel von Rennenkampf rather than officers such as Grekov or Mishchenko provides a compelling example of the effect one subordinate commander can have on a battle’s outcome. This may seem intuitive, but even prior to the 20th century there was a growing belief that the technological advances in the conduct of war increasingly favoured the science over the art of its conduct.
4. As a major in the US Army, were there any themes or lessons that you feel you gained from in a professional sense through this project?

The scale of the battlefield at Mukden and the accuracy and range of artillery rendered the task of attacking infantry units more difficult than in previous wars. The reasons for this are many, but in essence, a local breakthrough – say by the successful assault of an infantry brigade – would be difficult to exploit, as the artillery assets of the enemy’s divisions, corps and army could all range the location where the breakthrough was achieved. A successful attacking unit, already attrited from direct action, would potentially find itself under direct and indirect fire from up to hundreds of cannon.

In the 21st century context, military officers seem to face a similar problem. While we thankfully have a wide range of combat vehicles and other assets to assist infantry in achieving breakthroughs, the number, capabilities and ranges of indirect fire systems (artillery, etc.) have seemingly favoured the firepower of the defender even more in the 21st century than in the 20th. A successful assault by a mixed tank–infantry fighting vehicle brigade will quickly stall in the face of long-range artillery, rocket artillery, drone and aerial strikes.

There were two solutions to these problems in the Russo-Japanese War that may or may not prove true in the 21st century. The Japanese commander Marshall Oyama seemed to discover that relentless pressure across the entire front, combined with a never-ceasing drive to maneuver to the extreme flank of the enemy, was the only way to drive the Russians from their positions. On the other hand, when attacked frontally, the Russians nearly always held firm, resulting in attrition that favoured the defender.


5. What was the greatest challenge in writing the Mukden Campaign?

Carl von Clausewitz wrote, ‘Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.’ I think this relates to one of the bigger challenges in describing the Mukden campaign in a way that is interesting and insightful. At the highest conceptual level, the operation is simple to understand. The Japanese commander, Marshall Oyama, sought to initiate and develop an envelopment of the Russian left flank before launching his main effort against the Russian right flank. A pencil sketch could potentially suffice to give a general explanation of the operation. However, this explanation would not convey why the Japanese were successful, and why the Russians were unable to stop their advance. Answering these questions required me to consider the assigned role or mission of every unit in the battle (at least to the brigade level), what their individual challenges were and why certain divisions failed or succeeded to accomplish their missions.

Towards this end, one of my goals throughout the writing process was to give the Russian commanders and units their due. The Russians did not intend to lose the battle. In many cases they fought ferociously, and in some cases under able commanders. So why did they lose? In Mukden 1905, I sought to explain the most important points of ‘friction’ that arose in the battle. Explaining these events and commanders’ reactions to them should enable readers to understand how complex and difficult it can be for a commander to discern the enemy’s course of action, react to it and, ideally, maneuver one’s own forces to regain the initiative.
The scale of the battle posed a further challenge. The sheer number of units and clashes within the battle created a tension between usefully explaining the maneuvers of army and corps while not losing sight of the experiences of lower echelons – the battalions and companies – and how their efforts enabled or precluded victory for their respective armies.

 

You can read more in CAM 413 Mukden 1905: Russia and Japan's Battle for Manchuria