My latest book for Osprey examines land warfare in the past several decades, the current state of play, and, getting out the metaphorical crystal ball, forward into the next 20 years or so to take an educated guess at what ground combat will look like. One of the challenges when writing the book was the pace of battlefield innovation and adaption occurring in Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022. In fact, it led to several delays and missed deadlines as additional material was added as it emerged from the battlespace.

One word is synonymous with that innovation and adaption – drones. No other modern battlefield capability has been subject to as much hyperbole as the UAV or the uncrewed/unmanned aerial vehicle. Is it the future of war? Yes, it will play an increasingly significant part. Will it replace tanks/artillery/crewed aircraft/infantry (delete as applicable)? No, it won’t, but it will greatly increase the capabilities of each.

I argue that UAVs (and, increasingly, uncrewed ground vehicles – UGVs – and uncrewed maritime platforms, both surface and subsurface) will become another, equally important, element in the combined-arms mix. Sticking with UAVs, they offer a surveillance and reconnaissance platform that can stay aloft for extended periods (known as loiter or dwell time); an aerial electronic warfare platform capable of targeted or wide-band jamming; a long-range strike platform that can be configured against a range of target types; a light bomber; a mine-layer; and interceptors to engage other UAVs, particularly the so-called FPV or First Person View racing drones. Even drones which can fly missions under the direct control of the crew of an F-35 or AH-64E are in advanced stages of development.

Ukraine has fed a rapid cycle of innovation and adaption that has acted as a testbed for the world’s militaries as both the Russian and Ukrainian armies discover what can be accomplished with drones, and just as importantly, how to counter them. I’ve listed below, in no particular order, five quick innovations or adaptions from Ukraine which will likely have a wider impact on land warfare in the immediate future:


1. Cope Cages


Initially derided as a ham-fisted Russian attempt at countering top-attack munitions like the Javelin, cope cages have come into their own against kamikaze drones. Cope cages began as a cage-like structure over the top of the turret of Russian main battle tanks with the aim of initiating the FPV before it strikes the actual armour of the tank (and thus reduce its effectiveness as an armour penetrator) but have now been deployed widely across most vehicle types- including by Ukraine. The idea has also been adopted by the Israeli Defence Force on their Merkava tanks which deployed into Gaza, as a counter to Hamas drones.


2. Fibre-Optics


A literal game-changer in 2024 was the adoption of tethered fibre-optic cables to control drones, particularly FPVs. This involves the drone being controlled by an attached cable, meaning that it is safe from traditional electronic warfare methods of jamming the control interface or its GPS. Additionally, because the drone is displaying a vastly reduced electronic signature, it is much harder to ‘spot’ electronically. Both Russia and Ukraine have rapidly fielded fibre-optic controlled drones and neither side have, as yet, developed an effective countermeasure.


3. Interceptors


FPV drones have also been pressed into service to conduct drone-to-drone aerial intercepts. Ukraine developed the technique, which was soon copied by Russia. It has proven to be a somewhat cost-effective model as cheap FPVs are employed to target much more expensive systems like the Russian Lancet strike drone.

This has led to both sides also having to develop electronic countermeasures that can be fitted to their drones in an effort to jam the incoming interceptor. To date, interceptor FPVs have been most successful against slower moving reconnaissance drones, but efforts are being made to speed up the intercept rate to effectively target the likes of the Russian-Iranian Shahed-136.


4. UGVs


Uncrewed ground vehicles have been largely in the shadows in Ukraine whilst their aerial (and naval) cousins hog the limelight, but the war has proven a vital testing ground for a number of designs on both sides. UGVs have been employed in both non-kinetic roles (bringing up supplies; casualty evacuation; mine clearance) and kinetic (acting as a form of bomb droid to blow gaps in Russian defences or target armoured vehicles or troop concentrations; providing uncrewed fire support from mounted machine-guns). Dedicated counter-drone UGVs have been developed and will likely be fielded this year.


5. Motherships


In late 2024, we began to see evidence of the development and fielding of drone motherships. These included the Dovbush T10 which can carry a reported six FPVs under wing pylons. The advantage of these motherships is that they extend the range of the typically short-range FPV, allowing operators to strike far deeper behind enemy lines as the FPVs effectively piggyback on the mothership.

Speaking of motherships, as recently as January 2025, Ukrainian naval and special operations forces made drone history by firstly shooting down a pair of Russian Mi-8 HIP transport helicopters using surface-to-air missiles (actually repurposed air-to-air missiles in another example of wartime adaption) mounted on an uncrewed surface vessel (the Magura V5 drone boat), and later destroying Russian land-based air defences using kamikaze FPV drones – launched again from a Magura-class drone boat at sea.

Read more in Boots on the Ground: Modern Land Warfare from Iraq to Ukraine