It is quite common to attribute specific value to military events with the benefit of hindsight, without taking into account the actual situation at the time it took place and the views of the commanders involved. A clear example of this attitude is Hitler’s ‘halt order’ in May 1940 in front of Dunkirk, which is typically considered a mistake because it allowed the British forces to evacuate from the continent. What many do not take into account is how Hitler perceived the situation in that very moment, as he focused on the losses suffered by his panzer divisions and on the true objective of the campaign: the defeat of France. With hindsight it is possible to say that Hitler made a mistake as he failed to understand that France was already defeated, and that Dunkirk was the real key moment of the entire campaign.

The same applies to the 1940–41 campaign in East Africa, which is all too often examined alongside Italy’s defeats in North Africa and Greece during the same period. Italy’s military weakness and its inept military leadership prevented the country from taking advantage of the situation which, as Italy entered the war in June 1940, was entirely to its advantage. On paper, in 1940–41 Italy could have delivered a fatal blow to the British Empire in Africa and in the Middle East, with a potential pivotal outcome for the entire war. Given the disparity of forces (the Italians enjoyed numerical superiority in both North and East Africa in the summer of 1940), a wide-ranging strategic plan could have achieved what the British commanders did fear: a two-pronged offensive in Africa to pave the way to an Italian invasion of the Middle East.

Free from the French menace in the west, meaning the French forces in Tunisia were no longer a threat, the Italians could have massed their 250,000-strong armies in Libya to attack Egypt with the aim of reaching Alexandria and the Nile. There was little, if anything at all, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, could have done in this situation given the scarce forces available to his Western Desert Force. The Italians enjoyed great numerical superiority in East Africa as well, the some 200,000-strong army deployed there far exceeding that of the weak Sudan Defence Force. Had the Italians attacked from East Africa, advancing north along the Nile, Wavell’s forces would have faced a double threat which simply could not have been stopped. The Italians might have reached the delta and, from there, advance to Suez to effectively take control of the Eastern Mediterranean basin with the invasion of the Middle East as the next step.

But with hindsight it is possible to say that such a threat never existed. Already in 1938, the Italian Navy Staff had ruled out any possibility of supplying North Africa (let alone the isolated East Africa) given the combined strength of the French and the British Navies in the Mediterranean. As a result, the Italian Army Staff abandoned its strategic planning for an offensive in Africa, focusing instead on the Balkans. The situation did not change in June and July 1940, following the French defeat. Mussolini’s idea that Germany would soon invade and defeat Britain, deeply rooted in his mind, prevented Italy from taking advantage of the situation. The new commander in Libya, the over-cautious Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, was instructed to set up a token offensive intended only to show Italy’s participation to the war against Britain while the commander in East Africa, the Duke of Aosta, was intended to carry out demonstrative attacks at a local level. In August 1940, Italy achieved its first, and only, victory with the seizure of British Somaliland, which was followed a month later by the short-lived offensive in North Africa which halted at Sidi Barrani. Every opportunity to turn these tactical successes into a major threat against the British positions in Africa disappeared on 28 October 1940 when Italy attacked Greece.

Wavell may have realised at least some of the Italian shortcomings but, facing the situation in the summer of 1940, he had little, if any, choice at all. The first step was to defend the British positions in Egypt, Sudan and Kenya, the loss of British Somaliland being an acceptable sacrifice as long as it distracted the Italians. Meanwhile, reinforcements started to arrive, enabling Wavell to develop a strategy aimed at neutralising the Italian threat once and for all.

Already in early November 1940, the situation had turned to Britain’s advantage. The Italian inactivity in North and East Africa enabled the deployment of reinforcements, while the crisis faced by the Italians in Greece provided assurances as to their inability to react. Less than a month after the first British attack against the Italian-held positions along the border between Sudan and Italian East Africa (5th Indian Division’s attacks at Gallabat and Metemma), on 2 December General Wavell met with the commanders in Sudan and Kenya, Generals Cunningham and Platt, to outline his strategy. The basic plan was to check the Italians in North Africa, with General O’Connor starting a limited attack in December to dislodge them from Sidi Barrani, while preparing a large-scale offensive against East Africa with the aim of defeating the Italians there once and for all. In just two months Wavell’s plan was enforced, with spectacular achievements.

While O’Connor’s offensive in North Africa (starting from 9 December 1940) smashed the Italian units well beyond expectation, preparations for the two-pronged offensive against Italian East Africa were completed. The first move took place in mid-January 1941 from Kenya with the South African feint at Mega and El Yibo and was followed on 19 January by the 4th Indian Division’s attack from Kenya. On 4 February, the East African troops advancing from Kenya entered Italian Somaliland and, three days later, the Italian forces in North Africa were defeated at Beda Fomm. At the same time Cunningham’s forces prepared the decisive attack against the Keren fortress while in the Balkans, following the German preparations, the Greeks decided to ask for British help to face the incoming assault by the Wehrmacht. In less than eight months since Italy’s entry into the war, Wavell had overturned the strategic situation.

With hindsight, Wavell’s decision to focus on East Africa at the expense of North Africa and the Balkans has been criticised, the latter theatres of war being seen as more significant. The matter is still debated, and it is questionable whether keeping the 4th Indian Division in Egypt might have rendered the seizure of Tripoli possible, thus preventing the arrival of the Afrika Korps. It is also doubtful that the British intervention in Greece might have prevented the final seizure of the country by the Germans, this being seen as the unnecessary diversion that influenced the North African campaign. Facing the latest developments and struggling with Churchill’s requests, Wavell acted following the basic guidelines of military strategy. He focused his forces against the enemy’s weak spot with the aim of achieving a swift victory which could enable a prompt redeployment, as it did happen. In fact, the victory in East Africa was the only planned one, as no real plans were ever developed for an in-depth offensive in Libya or even for a prolonged resistance in Greece.

The German Blitzkrieg in the Balkans and Rommel’s first offensive in North Africa are remembered for their speed and decisiveness, but at the same time Wavell’s forces in East Africa achieved similar victories while dealing with far greater distances and a much more difficult terrain, making them similar if not greater achievements. By May 1941 the situation in East Africa had been stabilised, leaving only some scattered areas of Italian resistance which would be dealt with by the African troops by November. Already in June Wavell was able to start a first counteroffensive to relieve Tobruk from its siege while Rommel, whose advance had halted while Germany attacked the Soviet Union, could not rely on any useful support. In the long run, the British victory in East Africa had not only been Britain’s first victory, but also one of its more important ones from a strategic point of view. I can only hope that my latest Osprey Campaign title will help with a reconsideration of its importance and prevent it from being forgotten. Thank you to Johnny Shumate for the excellent artworks and the high-quality editing work done by the Osprey team.

You can read more in East Africa Campaign 1940–41.