The IJN was on the cutting edge of naval technology when the war began. Amplifying this advantage was a highly trained and skilled cadre of sailors and airmen. On a small-unit basis, the ships and aircraft of the Combined Fleet were the best trained in the world.

Gunnery
The IJN devoted considerable resources and training time to master the intricacies of gunnery. After their victory over the Russians in 1905, the Japanese took away the lesson that battles are won by big guns (such as those mounted on capital ships). A natural outgrowth of the belief in the primacy of big guns was a focus on outranging the enemy. If this could be achieved, heavy blows could be rained on the enemy before he could respond. This required extensive training in long-range tactics and the development of state-of-the-art fire control systems. By the start of the war, the IJN believed it had achieved the means to outrange the USN, with long-range gunnery placed at the center of daylight tactics. Both battleship and heavy cruiser gunnery focused on outranging tactics.

IJN guns were reliable and comparable in quality to their foreign counterparts. To gain the range required for outranging tactics, the Japanese relied on generating high muzzle velocities. Of the 12 battleships operational during the period, eight carried 14in. guns. Only two battleships carried 16in. weapons, with the two Yamato-class ships mounting 18.1in. guns – the largest ever fitted on a battleship. Each battleship also carried a secondary battery to engage targets at intermediate range. Since the Japanese did not develop a suitable dual-purpose gun, battleships also had to carry separate guns for long-range antiaircraft protection. All 18 heavy cruisers carried 8in. guns, which possessed excellent range but were handicapped by excessive salvo dispersion. Heavy cruiser secondary batteries comprised dual-purpose antiaircraft guns. Modern Japanese destroyers all carried a reliable long-range 5in. gun, but it was not comparable to its USN counterparts, being incapable of effective antiaircraft fire and hampered by a slow rate of fire.

IJN fire control systems were comparable to those in service with foreign navies at the start of the war. However, Japanese fire control directors were bulky and relied excessively on manual inputs, but they had the advantage of excellent optics. In August 1942, only a handful of Japanese ships possessed radar. These early devices were only capable of performing air search. At no point during the period from August 1942 to November 1943 did the IJN develop and field a device capable of performing radar-guided gunnery. The lack of radar was a critical weakness.

Even with the IJN’s emphasis on conducting gunnery at extended ranges, long-range gunnery is intrinsically difficult; the results during the first phase of the war were universally poor. Several examples highlight this. At the battle of the Java Sea in February 1942, the Japanese fought most of the battle at long range, as called for by their existing doctrine. In the daylight phases of the battle, conditions were as good as possible for long-range gunnery attacks. Even so, the results were poor. Of 1,619 8in. rounds fired from two heavy cruisers, only five found their target. Two days later, on March 1, during another day action fought at long range, two other heavy cruisers fired 1,171 8in. shells at a British heavy cruiser and scored just two hits. In the same action, an American destroyer was undamaged during the initial gunnery phase of the battle, and would have escaped if Japanese aircraft had not intervened.

Also on March 1, the Striking Force came across a USN destroyer. For 30 minutes, the battleship Hiei and heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma fired at the fleeing destroyer at long range, with little success. Dive-bombers had to be called in to slow it down, after which it was sunk by gunfire. The two cruisers fired 844 8in. and 62 5in. rounds, with Hiei firing 210 14in. and 70 6in. and fellow battleship Kirishima 87 14in. and 62 6in. shells. This was an exorbitant expenditure of shells against a single destroyer.

Accuracy at reduced ranges was much better. On March 2, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao came across another USN destroyer and engaged it at night, with illumination provided by star shells, from about 6,000yds. After expending only 166 8in. rounds, the destroyer was sunk.

The Bombardment

In mid-October 1942, the Combined Fleet conducted one of its most effective operations of the entire war in the waters off Guadalcanal. A large surface force under the command of Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita entered Ironbottom Sound with the mission of dealing Henderson Field a knockout blow. Kurita led a force of the battleships Kongo and Haruna, with an escort of one light cruiser and nine destroyers. The Japanese had prepared this operation with care. Kongo carried special Type 3 incendiary shells for its 14in. shells. Accuracy would be ensured by a gunnery officer from Yamato stationed atop Mount Austen overlooking the airfield and by four spotter and illumination aircraft, one with Kongo’s gunnery officer aboard. The bombardment began at 0133hrs on October 14 from a range of 29,500yds. Both battleships fired salvo after salvo at the airfield, expending a total of 973 shells. Except for a brief respite at 0213hrs when the battleships made a turn, the bombardment proceeded unhindered until 0256hrs. Only in the last few minutes of the operation did four American PT boats make an appearance, which prompted Kurita to suspend the bombardment five minutes early. The result was the temporary neutralization of Henderson Field’s offensive power, since virtually all the aviation fuel had been destroyed, only seven of 39 dive-bombers could still fly, and all the torpedo planes at the airfield were destroyed. In the aftermath of the bombardment, the Japanese were able to deliver some 4,500 men and a bounty of supplies and equipment to the island aboard a six-ship convoy. This scene shows the opening of the bombardment, with Kongo opening fire. In the background is Haruna, which had yet to begin its bombardment.